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Abstract
For decades, cost growth studies have been plentiful surrounding Department of
Defense acquisitions. Many different angles have been looked at to try and discover how
to better estimate cost, what causes cost growth, and how to mitigate it. This research
addresses this through examining cost growth from a longitudinal perspective, evaluating
cost growth factors at major program reviews, and assessing the cost growth by applying
color rating metrics. The results of this analysis show that breaking cost growth into
longitudinal segments of a programs lifecycle allows the true behavior of cost growth to
be seen, when it can often be masked in the traditional approach of evaluating lifecycle
cost growth. Additionally, when applying the proposed color rating system to cost
growth factors, significant variables are found to have dependencies with cost growth
factor color ratings. Significant relationships shown in the results were most commonly
like-color predictor and response variables. Additionally DT&E is shown as a flag for
high cost growth issues during a program lifecycle.
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A LONGITUDINAL STUDY AND COLOR RATING SYSTEM
OF ACQUISITION COST GROWTH

I. Introduction
General Issue
The Department of Defense (DoD) has been facing steady pressure to reduce
spending and program waste, and the near future will likely maintain this downward
pressure. Since 2010, the DoD budget has demonstrated a decreasing trend, as the
administration attempts to regain control of government spending. Figure 1, taken from the
2016 Annual Report on Performance of the Defense Acquisition System, shows the DoD
funding by budget accounts through the 2017 President’s Budget (PB). This highlights the
steep drop in funding the DoD is facing in today’s acquisition environment, which means
increasing pressure on current programs, forcing them to perform efficiently and effectively
with the funds that they manage.
While cost growth has historically been a burden on DoD funds, the increased
scrutiny and oversight on budget and performance increases the necessity of more reliable
cost estimates and tighter management of program cost growth.
DoD budgets are based on program inputs, and resources are planned and allocated
accordingly. When these costs become unreliable due to cost growth, future budgets must
adjust for the increased cost, constraining the flexibility of decision makers. Ultimately, as
programs struggle to compete for limited resources to cover growing costs, the warfighter
suffers from lost capability that cannot be funded, or must delay until further resources are
available. Therefore, enhancing the ability of programs to predict, identify, and manage
1

cost growth can allow for a more accurate management of resources and, in turn, likely
reduce the need for unidentified resources in the future. This presents the DoD with the task
of grasping a firm understanding of how cost growth behaves throughout a programs
lifecycle, how to mitigate it when possible, and how to manage it when present.

Figure 1: DoD Budget by Funding Account
Problem Statement
Historical performance of DoD programs shows that initial estimates are often overoptimistic compared to final program costs. In most circumstances, the initial estimate is
constructed and baselined at Milestone B, when programs first become a program of record.
The difficulty in estimating here is the multitude of changes a program will undergo over
the course of its post-Milestone B lifecycle. It has been called to attention that even after
accounting for uncertainty in their cost estimates, the official estimate is often looked at as a
2

point estimate with little to no consideration for a change in trajectory, and no indication of
uncertainty in the eventual budget process (DeNeve et al. 2015). This opens the flood gates
for cost growth when comparing actuals back to this initial baselined estimate. So while the
cost estimator is often burdened with the responsibility of accurate cost estimating, they are
often an easy target to blame when cost growth goes rogue.
The GAO report in 2009 made waves when they reported the change to total
acquisition cost from first estimate is 26%. This number is staggering, when you realize the
planned commitments were at $1.6 trillion (GAO, 2009). However, cost growth studies
have shown the figure to realistically be upwards of 50% (Arena et al., 2006). IDA and
RAND both compiled studies in attempt to capture the full extent of cost growth over a
program’s lifecycle. These studies both showed more realistic cost growth estimates were
45 and 46% respectively (Cancian, 2010). While the cost estimating career field has
expanded its role in recent years, the challenges that come with the nature of the unknown
make accurate cost estimating a difficult task. If the strength of initial program estimating
accuracy cannot necessarily be improved, monitoring the patterns of cost growth becomes
increasingly important.
Common issues that typically lead to cost growth are unclear or undefined
requirements, schedule delays, and technological complexity. Since it is unrealistic to
assume all cost growth can be prevented and eliminated, helping management accurately
forecast how cost growth affects the overall cost can be a valuable tool in early
identification and risk reduction. Porter et al. (2009) describe one of the primary causes of
cost growth to be weakness in management visibility, direction and oversight. Part of this
remains due to the limited tenure of management personnel, and the nonstop rotation of
3

decision makers. Often times decision makers are focused on the here and now, instead of
the program completion that may be 10-15 years down the road. When problems are
outside of the scope of their term, management can “kick the can” for a while. However, if
decision makers have cost growth data that can be applied longitudinally throughout the
entire lifecycle of a program, it becomes a more relevant part in the acquisition
environment. Instead of accepting a “rule of thumb” figure for overall cost growth, using
this research to help segment cost growth into short-term sections, makes the management
oversight firsthand and something that decision makers can actively engage in real-time cost
growth management.
As subsequent chapters explain, this research identifies the pattern of cost growth
over the life of a program. In addition to identifying trends in cost growth, this research
develops statistical guidelines of how cost growth may react given previous performance at
specified milestones, enabling managers to more accurately predict future program cost
growth levels.
Research Objectives and Scope
The objective of this research is to provide a tool for program managers and decision
makers to determine where cost growth levels will project, given cost growth incurred
during previous program milestones achieved. This research culminates in a color coding
system to help identify cost growth risk, and identifies significant predictor variables for
each color rating identifier.
For the scope of this analysis, 36 Aircraft programs across DoD are examined and
their cost growth performance is evaluated across 4 critical evaluation points between the,
initial Development Estimate (DE) at Milestone B and the final or most Current Estimate
4

(CE) available. Cost growth is measured by the cost growth factor (CGF), better defined as
the ratio of actual cost to the estimated costs. When the CGF calculated is greater than 1.0,
it indicates cost growth from the original estimate, an undesirable direction for the DoD
program. Each program is evaluated at these specified program review points, and the CGF
is documented accordingly. These trends are then mapped to a color rating system, which is
defined in Chapter III.
Research Questions
This research is focused on addressing to major research questions.
1. How does cost growth behave differently between a segmented longitudinal
perspective and a traditional lifecycle perspective?
2. What significant predictor variables forecast a given program review cost growth
position?
To address these questions, an analysis of trends and traits of programs is conducted to find
associated cost growth, to help identify causes associated with cost growth, and to project
their impact on future performance. This research identifies targets, in which given a
current state of cost growth, will provide a benchmark of ranges to predict the future state of
a program’s cost growth. This tool ultimately helps leadership identify where program cost
growth will lie at the next major evaluation point, given current program cost growth levels
incurred to date.
Methodology
Selected Acquisition Reports (SARs) outline a program’s current state and report
current funding estimates and actual expenses incurred for Major Defense Acquisition
5

Programs (MDAPs). This data is reported annually and provides insights into program
performance at key milestones. For this study, SARs are used to reference program cost
estimates and incurred expenses at selected dates. The SAR data used was collected directly
from Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR), and also
referenced from a database compiled by RAND, based on SAR data.
This research uses the data collected from the SARs to conduct an analysis on cost
growth trends. First, a general analysis of the descriptive statistics is profiled on the data.
This lays the groundwork for the analysis and helps to define the scope of the profiles.
Next, the CGF is calculated, and a stoplight color rating system is developed to categorize
cost growth factors in to easily identifiable risk categories that management can reference
for top-level reviews. Once this color rating system is developed, it is applied to each CGF
calculated. Finally, the color ratings are analyzed in relationship to each variable identified
and tested for significance.
Assumptions/Limitations
Potential limitations include differing definitions of key milestones between
programs assessed. In particular, IOC can be measured differently by each independent
program. In this case, the data as reported in the SAR was used without altering the dates to
standardize definitions. Other limitations include missing data within SARs such as
missing program view dates, limited availability of SARS prior to the implementation of
DAMIR in 1997, and a small sample size of aircraft programs meeting the appropriate
criteria for this research.

6

Summary
Knowing cost growth is a certainty of Defense programs, the ability to capture the
future cost growth into percentage brackets related to current performance levels may
provide program leadership the opportunity to adequately prepare for future performance
milestones. Instead of looking at long-term cost growth on a total program perspective, this
research lays the foundation for new cost growth calculations, taking a more short-term
decision making approach into consideration. Because management is not always
concerned with long-term progress, but rather the near term and close range decisions at
hand, having cost growth broken down into more manageable reviews should help aid
decision makers.
The remaining chapters that follow discuss the Literature Review, Methodology,
Analysis, Results, and Conclusion/Discussion. The literature review in Chapter II explores
how cost growth is defined for this study, previous studies on cost growth relevant to this
research, followed by a model on projected cost growth brackets. Chapter III walks through
the creation of a cost database and the subsequent tests conducted in the analysis. Key
analysis tests conducted include Contingency Table analysis and Fisher’s Exact Test for
significance. These combine to make the foundation for Chapter IV, where the results of
the analysis conducted are presented. Finally, Chapter V provides the conclusions of this
research, as well as recommended future areas of study.
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II. Literature Review
Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a foundation for this research. First, the method DoD uses to
define cost growth is discussed and historical performance is evaluated. Previous studies on
DoD cost growth are reviewed for foundational knowledge on cost growth. Additionally, the
literature review looks at statistical techniques used to evaluate cost growth. Lastly, this review
looks at studies with a longitudinal approach to cost growth in order to identify how cost growth
can be segmented, and identify potential areas of information in need of further study.
Cost Growth
With budgets being stressed by increasing requirements and demands, programs have
been forced to evaluate funding stressors. Therefore, there is increasing pressure to identify and
reduce cost growth both at the contract and program level. Oftentimes, programs may not be able
to reduce the cost growth. However, it can still be useful for a program to be able to accurately
project where the cost growth is headed in the future and allow for decision makers to adequately
prepare in advance of the next milestone. This research evaluates the probability of a program to
fall into a certain cost growth bracket given its current performance cost growth level.
Cost growth can be interpreted or perceived in a variety of ways, particularly depending
on the intent of the analysis. The simple answer is that cost growth, in its essence, is when
something costs more than expected. However, cost growth can be a combination of a multitude
of factors. The Select Acquisitions Report (SAR) is the foundational document used to assess
cost growth on DoD programs, and is the official reporting document used by the General
Accounting Office (GAO). The SAR divides cost growth in to seven main factors; Economic,
Quantity, Schedule, Engineering, Estimating, Other, and Support (Cancian, 2010).
8

Economic cost growth is most easy to distinguish, as this is cost growth caused by
inflation. Inflation is the general increase in prices of goods in the economy, making it external
to the control of the program. Therefore, for most analyses of cost growth, it is removed. While it
may appear that the cost of a program is getting more expensive throughout the life of the
program, adjusting to base year dollars will remove the effect of inflationary increases, allowing
a more accurate depiction of true program cost growth.
The cost growth caused by changes in quantity can also distort the perception of program
costs rising. Although overall program costs may appear to increase, if quantities are increased,
the true cost per item may not. While some may argue it is still cost growth, given the program is
costing more than originally projected, for this research changes in quantity are accounted for to
eliminate artificial cost growth.
While inflation and quantity are relatively easy to separate out for the purposes of
analyses, the remaining factors are inherently more subjective. These remaining factors are all
considered cost growth internal to the program and are the essence of data evaluated in this
research. It is these decisions between Milestone B and the current estimate that create the
pattern of longitudinal cost growth that is evaluated for inherent patterns in performance.
Previous Research Findings – Foundational Analysis
Once cost growth is defined, it can then be relatively measured. Many studies have
looked at the cost growth issue within the DoD due to its pervasive nature. However, different
approaches have been used to assess and predict cost growth trends. This section of the literature
review highlights cost growth research that used as a foundation for this research.
Drezner et al. (1993) studied CGFs of weapon systems in order to quantify the magnitude
of cost growth, and identify factors that affect it. Drezner et al. (1993) found that inflation and
9

quantity have the greatest effect on reported cost growth outcomes, but could be accounted for.
After removing the effects of both factors, program size and maturity are the two factors that
have the greatest effect on total program cost growth; smaller programs tend to incur higher cost
growth, while on average, maturity adds 2.2% above inflation per year (Drezner, 1993). Drezner
et al. (1993) validates that historic trends shows cost growth averages about 20%, and has not
seen significant fluctuations from that over the course of decades.
Drezner et al. (1993) assessed factors that affect cost growth, discovering that programs
with prototyping incurred higher cost growth. This is validated in our research findings in
Chapter IV. One explanation for this may be that prototyping tends to be present in programs
with higher technical uncertainty, which are inherently subject to higher cost growth (Drezner,
1993). This research provided a foundation for the need to adjust for inflation and quantity
changes, as well as account for prototyping as a variable.
Sipple et al. (2004) compiled a documentation of significant cost growth literature, to
highlight the variety of statistical methods applied to cost growth in DoD acquisition. The
analysis included a study on seven significant cost growth studies, compiled to summarize
significant findings for cost professionals. This research served as a foundation of historical cost
growth overviews.
Arena et al. (2006) presented a technical report that evaluated statistically significant
drivers of cost growth for completed programs with similar complexities to those of the U.S. Air
Force. Using data collected from the SAR, the CGFs for 68 completed programs are used in
analysis. The data is segmented by funding category, milestone, and commodity type to
accommodate different approaches in estimating.
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Arena et al. (2006) observed there is consistent underestimation of cost, a point that is
reiterated in later research. However, they continue on to find statistically significant drivers of
cost growth. Major findings include that programs with longer duration have greater cost
growth, that there are no statistically significant differences between the services, and little
evidence to support that cost growth has improved over time (Arena, 2006). Additionally,
significant cost growth occurs at MS II and MS III. Arena et al. (2006) is significant to this
research because it presents key drivers of cost growth that help form the selected variables
tested, as well as provides a rationale for using SARs in data collection.
Continuing on in research to identify cost growth drivers, Bolton et al. (2008) also
produced a paper for the RAND Corporation exploring causally oriented variance categories.
Bolton et al. (2008) defined four different categories of cost variance oriented towards the causes
of cost growth: errors in estimation and planning, decisions by the government, financial matters,
and miscellaneous sources, and reclassified the variances in the SARs into said categories. This
research then evaluated cost growth for development, procurement, and total program, by
identifying the significant cost drivers in each. According to this study, total cost growth is
dominated by decisions, accounting for more than two-thirds of the growth. This includes
quantity changes, requirements changes, and schedule changes.
Bolton et al. (2008) provided the foundation on the importance of quantity changes.
Most cost growth studies standardize for quantity changes, which eliminates their impact.
However, this study keeps quantity changes inclusive, stating it is still a factor of cost growth
and should therefore be measured. Because of this inclusion, Bolton et al. (2008) were able to
identify how truly significant the impact of quantity changes is in terms of growth. In fact, more
than half of the average procurement cost growth is due to quantity changes (Bolton, 2008).
11

Because of these findings, this research heavily considered leaving the quantity change effect as
part of the analysis; although the data was ultimately standardized remove those effects.
Deneve et al. (2015) focuses on the issues with DoD cost estimating instead of postestimation drivers, posing the question that perhaps the problem is not the accuracy of the cost
estimate, but that the estimates are estimating the wrong thing. Using an interesting analogy of
cost estimating to hurricane forecasting, Deneve et al. (2015) describe how cost estimates often
become the “sticker price,” and lose the risk and uncertainty analysis in the translation to the
budget process. They follow to create a macro-stochastic estimation model by identifying four
categorical variables with strong relationships to CGFs: program type, iteration, funding years,
and number of services. Deneve et al. (2015) conclude these groupings help predict the total cost
from the baseline estimate. This research provided the foundation of issues with cost estimation
in the DoD, an equal culprit to the cost growth problem.
Kozlak (2016) serves as a key foundation in this research. Multiple aspects of Kozlak’s
work were carried forward for additional study, including the identification of key aircraft
program reviews and milestones, the objective to calculate CGFs at these reviews, and
identifying the significant cost drivers that pertain to Aircraft programs.
Kozlak (2016) evaluated development, procurement, and total cost growth, defining
median cost growth percentage against median program percent completion. For example, at
IOC for procurement, the median percent of program completion is 48% and the median percent
of total cost growth is 91%. In evaluating each review point as well as percent complete, Kozlak
(2016) projected that at a median of 6.5 years after Milestone B, a program sustains
approximately 91% of the total program cost growth. Aside from evaluating the performance of
cost growth along a programs review cycle, Kozlak (2016) used logistic regression to identify
12

individual (x) variables that are predictive of cost growth (y). The regression results showed
Bomber, Prototype, and Weapon type to be the most predictive variables of cost growth.
The literature reviewed form the foundation of cost growth research, define significant
cost growth drivers, and depict overall trends of cost growth within different segments of the
DoD. This research combines the above efforts with a slightly varied approach of looking at cost
growth from a longitudinal perspective. That is, how does cost growth behavior change as time
changes? This research looks to dissect the life of a program into multiple evaluation points,
each with its own evaluation factors. This approach can give leadership increased opportunity to
evaluate, manage, and plan for cost growth on a more reliable timeline. While limited, some
research has been conducted using this longitudinal approach, and is presented in the next
section.
Previous Research Findings – Longitudinal Studies
This research takes the approach of evaluating cost growth on a longitudinal perspective,
looking at each individual program and its cost growth over time from Milestone B to the Final
or Current Estimate if still ongoing, which is defined in the SAR. While the research on cost
growth within the DoD is vast, those that evaluate from a longitudinal perspective are limited.
The remainder of this section summarizes the key literature on previous longitudinal cost growth
studies.
On one end of the longitudinal approach spectrum, research has looked at Earned Value
Management (EVM) with the intent of locating stabilization of cost growth. Since the early
1990’s, the EVM community has adopted what is known as the “stability rule,” from widely
known Christensen and Payne research (1992). Christensen’s findings show that the Cost
Performance Index (CPI) commonly stabilizes when the contract is at 20% completion
13

(Christensen and Heise, 1993). This concept was explored more recently, applying
Christensen’s concepts of “stability” to more recent DoD data (Petter, 2014).
Petter (2014) addresses this “stability rule,” indicating that recent research may provide
contradictory evidence that the CPI does not in fact stabilize at 20% completion. Petter (2014)
highlights the vague definition of “stability,” and further summarizes it in to three broad
categories: range definition, absolute interval definition, and relative interval definition. These
three definitions become the basis for Petter’s analysis. Using a variance analysis, Christensen’s
“stability rule” was both supported and contradicted, depending on the definition of stability
used. With the range definition of stability, the 20% complete “stability rule” is supported,
whereas either interval stability definitions did not (Petter, 2014). Petter (2014) then continues
the research continues to break down a contact’s life-cycle phase: Production or Development.
Here the longitudinal aspect of the research is shows, though applied to EVM and a contract
basis, making Petter (2014) both a foundational study, an updated approach to the “stability
rule,” and a take on the longitudinal approach to cost growth.
While EVM is a valuable tool, and understanding the CPI and its predictive measures on
final cost, EVM can be restrictive in that MDAPS are often split into a variety of contracts
throughout the life of the program. Therefore, the CPI limits measuring and predicting program
cost growth to only a small portion of the overall cost growth. This can be helpful to short-term
management of cost growth, but restricts long-term strategic thinking.
The other spectrum of the longitudinal approach encompasses how cost growth trends
over the course of history. Davis et al. (2016) performed one of the most recent evaluations of
cost growth within DoD MDAP programs. However, their approach to a longitudinal evaluation
was looking at cost growth rates by year, historically, across the DoD over the last three decades.
14

Davis et al. (2016) used a 5-year moving average of the annual changes to assess patterns of cost
growth in attempt to model growth. David et al. (2016) reveal that the pattern of historical cost
growth partially follows the defense budget, providing a new look at what may drive cost
growth. Other results show structural changes and legislation contribute to shifts in growth.
This approach of longitudinal evaluation shows how the acquisition process, policy reform, and
the behavior of the defense acquisition system play a role in cost growth trends over time. While
individual programs were assessed, they were not evaluated as cost growth independently across
its own lifespan.
Our research has shown that the longitudinal approach has looked both from a focused,
contract specific EVM perspective, as well as a timeline driven, DoD-wide overview. EVM is
focused on a contract basis, as EVM only looks at and measures performance on a contract level,
which can mask deeper issues on a total program level. Many DoD programs are comprised of
multiple contracts during its lifecycle. While EVM is a valuable tool in tracking performance, the
complexity of DoD programs and contract structure necessitate the need for research on how a
program performs over the duration of all contracts. In contrast, the time-phased approach looks
at how cost growth has changed within the DoD over time and not necessarily on an individual
program basis.
While this “longitudinal” concept has been explored, it leaves gaps in looking at the
concept specifically applied to an individual program. This facilitates the need for exploration of
the longitudinal approach and evaluation of cost growth trends throughout the specified life of
evaluation. For this research, the question of how cost growth behaves from a longitudinal
perspective across the life of the program is examined; more specifically, how is current cost
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growth a predictor of where cost growth will perform at the next measured milestone and what is
the relationship of cost growth levels between key performance milestones?
Summary

The literature review presented information on the sources of cost growth, standard
methods for estimating that growth, research on when cost growth occurs in weapon systems, and
potential variables to consider in our research. Chapter III, Methodology, discusses how we
approach addressing the goals of our research.
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III. Methodology

Chapter Overview

The purpose of Chapter 3 is to present the details of data used for analysis in this
research, as well as the methods used for evaluation. First, the sources used for data collection
are discussed. Next, the compilation and evaluation of the data is explained, followed by the
method used for data standardization. Finally, how cost growth is identified and analyzed at
each program review is discussed.
Data Collection

In order to analyze program cost growth factors, reliable data that contains program
review information must be obtained. In most previous studies pertaining to cost growth, the
SAR is used as a credible source of data, laying a foundation for the SAR as a reputable
source. The SAR is one of the best resources of data for acquisition programs, particularly for
the data points collected for evaluation within this research.
For this research, SAR data is utilized for program estimates, key dates, and program
relevant information. The primary resource used for SARs is the Defense Acquisition
Management Information Retrieval (DAMIR), which identifies various data sources that the
Acquisition community uses to manage Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) and
Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) programs and is the authoritative source for
Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR), SAR Baseline, Acquisition Program Baselines (APB),
MAIS Annual Reports (MAR), MAIS Original Estimates (MAIS OE), and Assessments.
(DAMIR webpage).
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Additionally, RAND Corporation has worked extensively with historical SARs,
compiling the annual reports into a SAR database. This database, which is built electronically
using separate Microsoft® Excel sheets per program, proved valuable for this research,
particularly for years that older SARs were not obtainable in DAMIR.
While SARs report key program dates, often gaps were left for the specific program
deliverables tracked for the purposes of this research. The Air Force Cost Analysis Agency
(AFCAA) previously compiled a database for the purpose of tracking DoD aircraft programs,
including information on significant program review dates. The AFCAA database, RAND
database, and DAMIR portal were combined to provide the information needed for analysis.
Data Summary

Cost growth is seen across programs of all types, in all services, and in many varying
degrees. However, the complexities of DoD acquisition make normalizing program
milestones across different services difficult, creating incompatibilities in evaluation.
Therefore, this research focuses only on aircraft programs within the DoD. Furthermore, the
analysis is limited to only Acquisition Category 1 (ACAT 1) programs, since the reporting
requirements for SAR do not extend to lower value thresholds. ACAT 1 programs are Major
Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPs), estimated to require eventual expenditure for
research, development, test and evaluation (RDT&E), including all planned increments, of
more than $480 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 14 constant dollars, or procurement, including all
planned increments, of more than $2.79 billion (FY 2014 constant dollars) (DAU, 2015).
Once the given criteria are applied to the SAR database, 36 DoD Aircraft programs are
captured for evaluation. Table 1 lists the programs used for analysis in this research.
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Table 1: Aircraft Programs Selected for Analysis
A-10

C-27J

F-35

AV-8B

E-2C

RQ-4

B-1A

E-2D

MQ-4C

B-1B

E-6A

P-8A

B-1B CMUP

EA-18G

S-3A

B-1B JDAM

EF-111

T-6 (JPATS)

B-2 RMP
C-130 AMP
C-17A
C-5 AMP
C-5 RERP
C-5B

FA-18EF
F-14A
F-14D
F-15
F-16
F-22

T-45TS
V-22 FSD
F-22 Inc 3.2B Mod
KC-46
MQ-1C
Reaper

Limitations
The collection of data within the DoD, particularly with respect to the acquisition
environment, is in and of itself a proven challenge. While in theory the DoD has an
acquisition process to guide key reporting dates and decisions, in practice many programs
deviate from this standard process. It therefore becomes difficult to create a standard set of
variables and tracking measures that are consistent enough across the population to perform a
thorough analysis. While ideally this research method could be applied to a variety of
programs, both aircraft and otherwise, the lack of common review points for measurement
makes the application difficult. Therefore, this study is limited to aircraft-only programs.
This research also heavily relies on the data contained within the SAR for each
program, which has limitations of its own. Many previous studies, including Kozlak (2016),
Arena et al. (2006), and Hough (1992) have discussed limitations surrounding the SAR. The
key limitations that are relevant to this study are summarized here.
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1. High–Level Data. While useful for obtaining dates and estimate information, SAR
does not provide in-depth explanations for said data. This means high-level
assumptions must be made, and critical details may be overlooked.
2. Reporting Guidelines and Requirement Changes. Over the historical span of SAR
reporting, many changes have evolved the process. This leaves room for
inconsistent comparisons among programs. Since this study spans the years from
the 1960’s on, it is particularly susceptible to this limitation.
3. Lack of Risk and Confidence Levels. Without this information, the estimates
contained in the SAR are taken at face value. If an estimate contains a significant
amount of associated risk, it may not be a valid representation of true program cost.
4. Each program creates its SAR for reporting. Since each individual program is
responsible for populating and submitting a SAR, each SAR will be unique. This
makes it difficult for comparison to other programs and virtually impossible for an
apples to apples analysis.
Also, DAMIR, while a valuable resource for collecting SAR data, only contains reports
post-1997. Prior SAR copies have not been electronically converted into the system, making
information hard to locate on older acquisition programs. While the RAND database was
validated against information on DAMIR for post-1997 SARS, older programs were unable to
be verified. It is therefore an assumption of this research that the RAND database is accurate
in its information collection and conversions. Given there were no errors detected in programs
that could be verified on DAMIR, it is a reasonable assumption that the RAND database is
accurate for evaluation.
In spite of the limitations within the SAR, its historical use in cost growth studies and
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relatively stable capture of vital information make it a reasonable source of information for
this analysis.
Another limitation is the assumption that this research and the results that follow may be
subject to a Type I error; that is, the incorrect rejection of the null hypothesis. Even though
this research is exploratory in nature and uses an alpha value of 0.10, the volume of variables
tested (720 total combinations) presents a much narrower window of significance. Therefore,
while it is likely the top variables noted play some important role, the level of true significance
is unknown until further research can be conducted. However, even with the knowledge of a
possible Type I error, the general purpose of this research is to find general trends in
longitudinal cost growth and meets that goal accordingly.
Data Set and Predictor Variables

In order to evaluate cost growth patterns across a program lifespan, key program dates,
all encompassed by the Milestone B estimate and the Last Reported SAR (LRS) were selected.
Each key date represents a new bracket of evaluation. These dates, subsequent to the
development estimate at Milestone B, are used to track how cost growth moves across the
longitudinal span of the program, relating each to its predecessor evaluation point, as well as the
DE. The research of Kozlak (2016) identified four key dates critical to the evaluation of DoD
Aircraft cost growth between Milestone B and LRS. As such, the same program events are
used for the purposes of this research, to include:
1. Development Estimate point (Milestone B)
2. Critical Design Review (CDR)
3. First Flight (FF)
4. Development Test and Evaluation (DT&E)
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5. Initial Operating Capability (IOC)
6. Final Estimate or Last Reported SAR (LRS)
For each program review point, the Current Estimate is considered the estimate provided in the
SAR for the year in which the review point occurred.
In addition to the date and estimate value at each program review, other program
information is captured by for analysis. The following predictor variables considered for
evaluation of program cost growth are listed and described as follows:
•

Air Force – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the aircraft is developed for the Air Force.

•

Navy – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the aircraft is developed for the Navy.

•

Pre-1997 BY – Binary Variable
o This dummy variable identifies if the base year evaluated occurs before
1997. The year 1997 identifies the point in which SAR information
becomes available electronically within DAMIR.

•

Prototype – Binary Variable
o This variable represents programs that create a prototype, or prototypes,
of a weapons system before production of that weapons system begins.
More than one type of prototype for a weapons system can be created in
a given program.

•

Modification – Binary Variable
o This variable is concerned with programs whose existence serves as a
modification to a pre-existing weapons system.

•

Small Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the estimate at Contract Award (Milestone B)
is considered “small.” See Figure 2 for evaluation of program size.

•

Medium Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the estimate at Contract Award (Milestone B)
is considered “medium.” See Figure 2 for evaluation of program size.
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•

Large Program – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the estimate at Contract Award (Milestone B)
is considered “large.” See Figure 2 for evaluation of program size.

•

Duration <180 (Months) – Binary Variable
o This variable indicates if the program length from CA-LRS was less than
180 months. The 180 month period was determined a significant break in
contract length when all programs were evaluated on a distribution analysis.

Figure 2: Distinction of Cost Growth Program Size

Other variables are present in the database for program information and reference;
however, they were not included in tested variables for the purposes of this study. These
variables include:
•

Contractor – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies which contractor is responsible for the program
development. If a contractor only appeared once, it was identified in
the “Other” variable.

Given the very small sample size and the wide mix of contractors, this variable is likely a weak
predictor for this analysis.
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•

Quantity – Continuous Variable
o This variable reports the quantity predicted at the time of the program
review.

Quantity is used to calculate the estimate/quantity factor to standardize the CGF. However, it
is not tested as a variable.
•

Percent complete – Continuous Variable
o This variable measures the cost spent to date compared to the estimate
value in the Last Reported SAR.

This is a common variable when evaluating cost growth. Percent complete is calculated based
on the actual cost to date as a percentage of estimate at LRS. However, due to the
inconsistencies of actual costs reported and the limitations of the SAR, this variable is limited
in integrity, and is left out accordingly as a predictor variable for this analysis.
Estimating Cost Growth

To assess cost growth, this study evaluates what is referred to as a Cost Growth Factor
(CGF). This is the calculation of current estimate as it relates to a previous, or
original baseline, estimate. The CGF method divides the estimate plus the cost variance
(actual) by the estimate (Drezner et al., 1993)
The neutral state of a CGF is where actuals equal the estimate, returning a value of 1.0.
This indicates there has been no program cost growth. When the CGF is greater than 1.0, the
program actuals are higher than the estimate, showing that there has been cost growth sustained
by the program. Conversely, a CGF less than 1.0 indicates that the current cost of the program
is less than the estimate, or a projected cost-underrun. To calculate the percent cost growth,
subtract 1 from the cost growth factor (Drezner et al., 1993)
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A program carries multiple estimates over its lifecycle. First, a Planning Estimate
(PE) is the estimate made during the Concept Exploration and Definition stage. Because
this estimate is prior to Milestone B, it is not referenced for analysis in this research. The
Development Estimate (DE), often referred to as a baseline estimate, occurs at Milestone B
and is used as the foundational estimate in this research. Finally, the Current Estimate (CE)
is the most up to date estimate. If a program is complete, the CE is the actual cost of the
program (Calcutt, 1993).
Estimators calculate cost growth from a baseline estimate, the PE, DE, or CE.
Typically, the DE at MS B is the baseline estimate for cost growth. MS B is the point in the
schedule where a program enters full-scale development and officially becomes a
“program of record.” Once a program of record is established, the program is required to
file official cost reports with Congress (Porter et al., 2009). As formal cost reports
materialize, cost growth becomes easier to track, and for this reason, the estimator
measures cost growth from the DE when possible.
Data Standardization

The quantities each aircraft program produces typically shift both upwards and
downwards throughout the stages of a program’s lifecycle. Accounting for this change is a
contested topic in terms of cost growth. The argument presents two ways: Cost growth
associated with change in quantity is still cost growth that needs to be measured, and cost
growth associated with change in quantity needs to be standardized to view cost growth
inherent to the system. For this research, the cost growth factor is standardized to account
for any change in quantity. SARs list the quantities estimated and produced for each
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aircraft program. In order to standardize the cost growth factor for quantity, a cost per
aircraft is calculated at each program review point. This amount is then used in the
calculation of the cost growth factor.
In addition to quantity, the database is standardized for consistent Base Year (BY)
reporting. While not all 36 programs are evaluated in the same BY, each individual
program maintains a common Base Year across each review point, making comparison of
cost growth consistent. Since the comparison is from within each program and not across
all programs, it is not necessary to convert all programs to the same BY. In most cases,
the BY is the original year in which the program was estimated. In some cases, however,
the BY was updated at some point throughout the life of the program. In these instances,
the most recent BY is applied across all review points.
Cost Growth

Once the cost per aircraft at each program review is calculated, the cost growth
factor for a variety of combinations is found in order to evaluate the cost growth from a
longitudinal perspective. This combination of interlocking cost growth evaluation is what
distinguishes this research from cost growth research in the past. Each combination of
cost growth factors is evaluated in order to present a tool of identification for cost growth
management. Table 2 shows the combinations of cost growth evaluated. Each
relationship is assigned a number for analysis naming purposes and is identified to the
right of the relationship title.
In Tier I, relationships 1-5, the overall cost growth incurred from Contract Award
to each subsequent program review is evaluated. Tier I measures cost growth while
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holding the first review point of Contract Award constant. More specifically, the first
evaluation point measured is Contract Award to Critical Design review, while the last
cost growth factor in this tier represents total growth from Contract Award to Last
Reported SAR.
Table 2: Review Relationship Tiers
Tier I
Contract Award - Critical Design Review (1)
Contract Award - First Flight (2)
Contract Award - Development Test & Evaluation (3)
Contract Award - Initial Operating Capability (4)
Contract Award - Last Reported SAR (5)
Tier II
Critical Design Review - First Flight (6)
First Flight - Development Test & Evaluation (10)
Development Test & Evaluation - Initial Operating Capability (13)
Initial Operating Capability - Last Reported SAR (15)
Tier III
Critical Design Review - Development Test & Evaluation (7)
Critical Design Review - Initial Operating Capability (8)
Critical Design Review - Last Reported SAR (9)
First Flight - Initial Operating Capability (11)
First Flight - Last Reported SAR (12)
Development Test & Evaluation - Last Reported SAR (14)

Secondary evaluation includes program review combinations noted in Tier II,
relationship numbers 6, 10, 13, and 15. Relationship 1 is also re-considered as a part of
Tier II analysis. This tier is depicting the cost growth at each longitudinal cross section,
as the program moves through the lifecycle. Instead of the overall cost growth measured
in Tier I, dissecting the program down to each intermittent phase of the program lifecycle
can help to show a more definitive image of how cost growth behaves at subsections of
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the program. Tier II is the focus of management decision making tools provided in this
research.
Finally, Tier III combinations are evaluated showing remaining combinations of
phases. While this research focuses primarily on results from Tier I and Tier II, Tier III is
used for further analysis and confirmation of suspected indicators.
Color Coding Cost Growth

A stoplight chart is a color coded decision tool that helps quickly identify project
status and risk levels using visual aids. Typically, Green, Amber, and Red are used to
indicate the status of a program. However, subjectivity is involved in defining the
conditions as to what constitutes red, green, or amber status, and must be rationally
defined. For the purposes of this research, a distribution summary of cost growth factors
is evaluated for color break points. A review of the distribution of CGFs for each of the
15 program review relationships, as well as the overall distribution, is analyzed for logical
divisions. Figure 3 shows the distribution analysis for Contract Award-Critical Design
Review as an example of the distribution breakout. The other distribution summaries can
be found in Appendix A.
Green indicates low to no risk and identifies programs that incur a CGF of 1.0 or
less. As previously indicated, this means that the actuals are at or below the estimated
value. Amber signifies the program has encountered some risk, but is not yet in jeopardy
of serious trouble. Programs that fall in this category are highlighted for extra attention
and scrutiny, but are still within the range of correction. This research shows that
programs stay moderately stable up until the 10% cost growth range; therefore, Amber
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coded programs are defined as those which encounter cost growth ranging from 1.0 to
1.10. After 10%, cost growth starts to vary widely with large inconsistencies and
predictabilities. Therefore, a CGF that lies above 1.10 is identified as Red.

Figure 3: Distribution Used for Color Rating Assignment
Following the categorized levels identified for each color, the CGF at each Tier
and Tier sub-section is allocated to its respective color rating in order to assign a risk
level color for that section’s cost growth. This adds the response variables to the
database. The following variables are now incorporated for analysis:

•

Green – Binary Variable
o This variable identifies if the analyzed CGF falls at 1.0 or below.

•

Amber – Binary Variable
o This variable indicates if the CGF falls between the range
1.0 < CGF ≤ 1.10.

•

Red– Continuous Variable
o This variable indicates if the CGF is > 1.10.
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This step is captured for each of the 15 program review relationships identified
above in Table 2. The first relationship is identified as Green/Amber/Red, while the
second relationship is identified by Green2/Amber2/Red2. This identification helps
subsequent analysis between different program review points. In addition to the evaluation
of the CGF between each of the six program review points (totaling the 15 relationships),
the assigned color at each review point for each relationship is compared to look for trends
in programs across their lifecycle. For example, if a program is Green at the first program
review, is it more likely to be Green at evaluation point 2? This analysis reviews each
combination of factors to help provide insight to longitudinal cost growth behavior
patterns.
Two-Way Contingency Tables

This research focuses on multinomial experiments looking for significant
relationships with respect to two qualitative factors. Each combination of factors present
in the database are compared in order to distinguish the most statistically significant
relationships in a program lifecycle that helps to predict the color status of a program at
any given review point. Among the 15 program review relationships, 720
predictor/response combinations are tested for independence. Table 3 shows the predictor
variables and response variable combinations that are tested in this research. Only valid
relationships are denoted by a “1”. Relationships not indicated by a “1” are those in which
the predictor variable is not applicable to the response variable. For instance, Green
cannot predict a response of Green; therefore, no relationship is present and no “1” is
denoted.
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Table 3: Predictor and Response Variable Combinations

Response
G
A
R
G2
A2
R2
G3
A3
R3
G4
A4
R4
G5
A5
R5
G6
A6
R6
G7
A7
R7
G8
A8
R8
G9
A9
R9
G10
A10
R10
G11
A11
R11
G12
A12
R12
G13
A13
R13
G14
A14
R14
G15
A15
R15

AF Navy Pre97
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

Predictor
Post97 Prototype Mod Small Meduim Large <180 mo
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

G A R G6 A6 R6 G10 A10 R10 G13 A13 R13

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

1
1
1

The method of analysis used is a contingency table (also known as a cross
tabulation or crosstab) to look for independence among variables. A contingency table
displays the frequency distribution of the variables. They are heavily used in survey
research because they provide a basic picture of the interrelation between two variables.
Table 4 shows a basic summary of a contingency table between two variables, A and B.
For each variable there are two responses. A response of “no” indicates the variable does
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not meet the criteria, and a response of “yes” indicates the variable meets the criteria. For
each combination of variables A and B, four combinations are possible:
1. No, No
2. No, Yes
3. Yes, No
4. Yes, Yes
Each combination is counted, and the count is represented in the table by n 11 , n 12 , n 22 ,
n 22, respectively. The counts are then totaled in each column (C 1 and C 2 ) and Row (R 1
and R 2 ), and a total count of observations, n, is determined. Once each row and column
is populated, the counts are then compared to expected values and measured for
independence.

Table 4: Sample Contingency Table

No
Variable A Yes
Totals

Variable B
No
Yes
n11
n12

Totals
R1

n21

n22

R2

C1

C2

n

Fisher’s Exact Test
To assess the significance of the contingency table, a P-value is calculated. A
variety of methods can be used in calculating a P-value. Due to the small sample size of
this research, Fisher’s Exact Test is used. Fisher’s Exact Test is a statistical test used to
determine if there are nonrandom associations between two categorical variables drawn
from calculated contingency tables. Apart from other significance tests available, a
benefit of using Fisher’s Exact Test is that it does not estimate the probability of a value;
32

rather the test calculates the exact probability of receiving the observed data (Kozlak,
2016). While the test is available for any sample size, it is particularly useful when
sample sizes are small, as other applicable tests are limited. Although the total sample
size used in this study is 36 programs, each combination of variables results in many
cases where there is an even smaller sample set. This makes Fisher’s Exact Test an
acceptable measure for independence between a program having defined color rating and
the explanatory variables considered in this thesis.
To understand Fisher’s Exact Test, two assumptions are necessary. The first
assumption is that all observations are independent. Second, the test operates under fixed,
or conditioned, row and column totals. This second assumption is what distinguishes
Fisher’s Exact Test from other statistical independence tests with unconditioned rows and
columns (McDonald, 2009).
The results of Fisher’s Exact Test produce both a 1-tailed and a 2-tailed
hypothesis test. The 1-tailed test uses a single tail of the probability distribution (either
left tail, or right), and examines changes in a single direction. The hypothesis for a 1tailed test is:
•

Ho: the factors are the same

•

Ha: the probability the color rating is greater for the factor = ‘1’ than ‘0’
(right tailed)

•

Ha: the probability the color rating is greater for the factor = ‘0’ than ‘1’
(left tailed)

The 2-tailed test uses both tails of a probability distribution (both right and left)
and examines changes in both directions. The hypothesis for a 2-tailed test is:
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•

Ho: the factors are the same

•

Ha: the factors are not the same

This research uses the 1-tailed hypothesis tests to identify if a categorical factor
increases the likelihood a program will have the tested color rating. The null hypothesis
states the categorical variable does not affect the color rating. If the p-value for a right
sided test is significant, the predictor variable increases the likelihood of the tested
response color rating. If the results were significant for the left sided test, the predictor
variable is less likely to produce the tested response color rating.
Fisher’s Exact Test is used to look at each categorical predictor variable, identified
above, against each color rating. In turn, as the color ratings progress from Green to
Green2 and forward, the previous color ratings also become tested predictor variables.
Chapter Summary

This chapter details the research methodology used. The collection of data from
the SAR and DAMIR is described. Predictor variables that provide a link to the response
variable were identified and explained. The reasoning for the methodology used is
provided along with a detailed explanation of the Fisher’s Exact Test for analysis. The
next chapter introduces the results to the testing involved in this research, and the analysis
of findings.
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IV. Results and Analysis

Chapter Overview

This chapter provides the results from the methodology outlined in Chapter III.
First, a color code is distinguished for each of the 15 program review relationships.
Second, an analysis of the specified techniques is conducted on the 720
predictor/response relationships in the database. The findings are then measured and
compared. Finally, the details of the significant variables are discussed and summarized.
Color Rating Summary
The overview of our database revolves around how the risk of cost growth is
depicted across the program lifecycle. As discussed in Chapter III, risk levels are defined
as Green, Amber, or Red, and are applied on a basis of CGF at the given program review
point. Each program receives a color rating at each of the 15 relationship points,
although this research focuses on the results from Tier I and Tier II relationships. Tier III
findings did not produce results that enhance the longitudinal evaluation, and therefore
were excluded from analysis. While the color rating does not tell the complete story,
which is supported by our further analysis, it does provide a management level overview
of how cost growth has historically behaved throughout the longitudinal aspect of a
program. Table 5 shows the color rating summary for Tier I relationships.
Table 5 shows how the color rating of a program changes as a program moves
from Contract Award to each program review point. It is important to know that these
relationships depict overall cost growth as they all start at CA and move forward. While
this is a good indicator of program health, it is also a commonly studied and traditional
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view of looking at cost growth. Therefore, this research breaks down the program
lifecycle further, reviewing each individual subsection of a program for a more distinct
picture on the behavior of cost growth, indicated by Tier II relationships.
Table 5: Tier I Color Rating Summary
Program

CA-CDR

CA-FF

CA-DTE

CA-IOC

CA-LRS

A-10
AV-8B
B-1A
B-1B
B-1B CMUP Computer Upgrade
B-1B CMUP JDAM
B-2 RMP
C-130 AMP
C-17A
C-5 RERP
C-5B
E-2C
E-2D
E-6A
EA-18G
EF-111
FA-18EF
F-14A
F-15
F-16
F-22
F-35
RQ-4 (GLOBAL HAWK)
MQ-4C
P-8A
S-3A
T-6 (JPATS)
T-45TS
V-22 FSD
F-22 Inc 3.2B Mod
KC-46

Tier II relationships take a more in depth view of cost growth, by looking at each
CGF independently of historical behavior. Instead of moving from CA forward, Tier II
only looks at the relationship of a program review cost growth as it relates to the cost
growth of the preceding review point. This can help management predict a more short36

term planning strategy. While the program may have an overall CGF of red, the near term
in real-time may have a level or decreasing CGF. While long-term mitigation may be in
need, management can strategically plan for real-time responses. Table 6 shows the color
ratings for Tier II evaluation.
Table 6: Tier II Color Rating Summary
Tier II

CA-CDR

CDR-FF

A-10
AV-8B
B-1A
B-1B
B-1B CMUP Computer Upgrade
B-1B CMUP JDAM
B-2 RMP
C-130 AMP
C-17A
C-5 AMP
C-5 RERP
C-5B
E-2C
E-2D
E-6A
EA-18G
EF-111
FA-18EF
F-14A
F-15
F-16
F-22
F-35
RQ-4 (GLOBAL HAWK)
MQ-4C
P-8A
S-3A
T-6 (JPATS)
T-45TS
V-22 FSD
F-22 Inc 3.2B Mod
KC-46
MQ-1C
Reaper (block 1)
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FF-DTE

DTE-IOC IOC-LRS

The results in Tier II color rating appear to be more incomplete than Tier I. This is
due to the fact that the most common missing date among programs is for CDR.
Therefore, the first two relationships in Tier II are affected, where in Tier I, only one
relationship would be affected. However, even with incomplete data, the results of color
ratings for Tier II show an overall summary that provides significant insight. Table 6
shows that cost growth factors rate red significantly less than in Tier I (29 vs. 64). Also, of
the 29 red ratings, 13 (45%) occur during FF-DTE (relationship 10). Even before running
contingency tables and Fisher’s Exact Test, this shows strong support that not only is the
CGF significantly different when looking at a program from a longitudinal perspective
versus a lifecycle perspective, the primary driver of high CGF is the Development Test and
Evaluation phase. This insight can help decision makers plan best for mid-program cost
increases, while avoiding over-anticipation of program end turmoil.
The color rating assignment and comparison paves the way for further analysis.
Now that an overall picture is painted, we dive further by running contingency tables
between the 720 combinations of variables, in order to best determine what are strong
predictors of the defined color rating at each given review point. While we evaluate 720
relationships across the 15 stated relationships, this research focuses on those within Tier I
and Tier II.
Tier I Results
Tier I contingency tables test every nominal variable against each of the 15 color
ratings within Tier I relationships (Green through Red5). As previously mentioned, Tier I
shows overall cost growth as a program moved from Contract Award to each review
point of the lifecycle. For each contingency table evaluated, a Fisher’s Exact Test value
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is compared to an alpha value of α = 0.10. This section walks through the significant
findings within Tier I, focusing on the five most significant dependencies, and
summarizing the remaining significant findings. A general analysis summarizes our Tier
I findings before the discussion of Tier II examination.
Green3 given Green2
The most significant dependency in Tier I evaluations is Green3 (CA-DTE) given
Green2 (CA-FF). Figure 4 shows the contingency table results for this analysis. While it
seems fairly logical that if a program is Green at one evaluation point, it is more likely to
be Green at the second evaluation point, this relationship is extremely significant, with
the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 0.0001 (Table 7).

Figure 4: Contingency Table Color Chart for Green3 Given Green2
Table 7: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Green3 Given Green2

The contingency table in Table 8 shows the expected count of programs being
green at both points is roughly 2.5 whereas this analysis encountered 7 programs. It is
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also important to note that Green3 encompasses DTE, which is the area of most
significant cost growth in a program. Therefore, this finding is valuable to management
and decision makers, in that if a program is still maintaining a Green color rating at FF, it
is very likely that it will complete DTE with minimal cost growth.
Table 8: Contingency Table for Green3 Given Green2

Maintaining Green at point 3 could be a critical factor in a program’s decision
structure and funding profile. This relationship shows management that efforts to
maintain a Green rating at FF can truly impact its overall CGF. This may aid pushing
management to make early investments to mitigate cost growth, as it provides the most
return on investment.
Red5 given Red3
In contrast to the results provided above in the first analysis, the second most
significant dependency in Tier I evaluations is Red5 (CA-LRS) given Red3 (CA-DTE).
Figure 5 shows the contingency table results for this dependency. Following the logic
that a Green rating early on will aid long term Green status, this relationship shows that
hitting a Red rating early on will ultimately push the program into Red status for the long
haul. This relationship is highly significant, with the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at
0.0002 (Table 9).
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Figure 5: Contingency Table Color Chart for Red5 Given Red3

Table 9: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red5 Given Red3

The contingency table in Table 10 shows the expected count of programs being
Red at both points is roughly 11.3 whereas this analysis encountered 16 programs that
completed LRS in a Red rating. It is also important to highlight, that of the 17 programs
that were rated Red at DTE, 16 of them continued to rate Red at LRS. This is a
significant indicator to management as to where the program is headed if cost growth is
out of control by DTE.
The first two dependencies analyzed highlight the importance of program status as
of DTE, providing further encouragement for decision makers to invest early in mitigating
cost growth drivers.
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Table 10: Contingency Table for Red5 Given Red3

Red5 given Green3
Further supporting the first two analyses, the relationship between Red5 (CA-LRS)
and Green3 (CA-DTE) is also statistically significant. While the analysis of Red5 given
Red3 indicated a high likelihood that a program is Red at DTE will stay Red at LRS, the
Red5 given Green3s relationship shows that Green at DTE makes it unlikely a program
will be Red at LRS. Figure 6 shows the contingency table results for this analysis. The
Fisher’s Exact Test shows a P-Value of 0.0017 (Table 11); however this is a left sided
result, showing that it is less likely to return a “1” at Red 5 than 0.

Figure 6: Contingency Table Color Chart for Red5 Given Green3
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Table 11: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red5 Given Green3

The contingency table in Table 12 shows the expected count of programs being
Red at LRS given Green at DTE to be approximately 4.7. However, of the 7 programs
that had a rating of Green at DTE, only 1 encountered a rating of Red at LRS. This is
even further validation that strong control of cost growth early can minimize the risk of
extensive cost growth throughout the entire program lifecycle.
Table 12: Contingency Table for Red5 Given Green3

The top three significant relationships all return with a commonality; DTE
indicating a very relevant target for programs in terms of cost growth management.
Green5 given Modification
The fourth result, when ranked by lowest P-value, shows Modification as a
predictor of Green at review point 5 (CA-LRS). Figure 7 shows the contingency table
results for this analysis. The Fisher’s Exact Test has a P-Value of 0.0017 (Table 13);
indicating that for Green5, it is more likely for Modification=1 to return a value than 0.
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Figure 7: Contingency Table Color Chart for Green5 Given Modification

Table 13: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red5 Given Green3

The contingency table in Table 14 shows that the expected count of programs being
Green at LRS given the program is a Modification is approximately 3.2. However, 7
programs met these criteria.
Table 14: Contingency Table for Green5 Given Modification
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It is also important to note here that a solid color bar appears in the contingency
table. This shows that of all programs not coded “Modification,” zero returned a value of
“1” at LRS. While not the tested variable, this is extremely important to note for
management planning purposes, as it indicates there is a very low change of a non-mod
program ending in a Green rating.
Red3 given Red2
Once again DTE returns to the forefront. The final significant finding in the top 5
of Tier I, shows the dependency between Red3 (CA-DTE) and Red2 (CA-FF). Figure 8
shows the contingency table results for this analysis. The Fisher’s Exact Test shows a
right sided P-Value of 0.0052 (Table 15) depicting that the probability for a Red3 rating
is greater for Red2=1 than 0.

Figure 8: Contingency Table Color Chart for Red3 Given Red2
Table 15: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red3 Given Red2
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The contingency table in Table 16 shows the expected count of programs being
Red at DTE given the program is Red at FF is approximately 5.7, whereas the analysis
returned a value of 9. Also, once again a solid colored bar appears in the contingency
table. This is represented by the circumstance that every program that produced a Red
rating at FF returned a red rating at DTE. This is perhaps another look at how early cost
growth performance dictates long-run outcomes.
Table 16: Contingency Table for Red3 Given Red2

Other Significant Tier I Results
Of the Tier I relationships tested, 32 flagged as significant dependencies at the
confidence level α = 0.10. Table 17 shows the remaining 27 significant findings. Each of
these findings is sorted by their level of significance, not by the variables impacted. Also
noted is the direction of the tail on the test, to define how the relationship is related.
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Table 17: Other Significant Tier I Results
Response
Red2
Green2
Green5
Red3
Red5
Red4
Red
Red2
Green5
Green5
Red5
Red2
Red5
Amber2
Red3
Green3
Green2
Green3
Amber
Amber2
Amber
Green4
Green4
Red4
Red4
Green
Red2

Predictor
Red
Green
Red3
Green2
Modification
Red2
Large
Prototype
Green2
Green3
Green
Medium
Red2
Amber
<180 months
Red2
Prototype
Amber2
Pre97
Medium
Navy
Red2
Red3
Green2
Red3
Pre97
Large

Fishers Exact Test
0.0055
0.0065
0.0078
0.0104
0.0131
0.0136
0.0162
0.0179
0.022
0.0239
0.0252
0.026
0.026
0.0266
0.0311
0.0358
0.0396
0.0567
0.0749
0.0787
0.082
0.0875
0.0907
0.0965
0.0965
0.0982
0.0983

Direction
Right
Right
Left
Left
Left
Right
Right
Right
Right
Right
Left
Left
Right
Right
Left
Left
Left
Left
Left
Right
Right
Left
Left
Left
Right
Right
Right

Tier II Results
Tier II contingency tables test every nominal variable against each of the 15 color
ratings within Tier II relationships (relationships 1, 6, 10, 13, and 15). Unlike Tier I, Tier
II shows the individual cross sections of the program lifecycle which provides better
insight into the true behavior of cost growth at each longitudinal section, as opposed to
the overarching view traditionally taken. Just as tested in Tier I, for each contingency
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table evaluated, a Fisher’s Exact Test value is compared to an alpha value of α=0.10.
This section discusses the significant findings within Tier II, focusing on the five most
significant dependencies, and summarizing the remaining significant findings. A general
analysis summarizes the Tier II findings before the discussion of the overall analysis.
Amber6 given Amber
The most significant dependency in Tier I evaluations is Amber6 (CDR-FF) given
Amber (CA-CDR). Figure 9 shows the contingency table results for this analysis. This is
the first appearance of Amber in the analysis, and it consists of not one side, but both
sides of the dependency. In Tier I analysis, programs depicted Green or Red much more
than Amber. Dissecting the programs on a small scale shows a lot more variability to the
behavior of the cost growth. Table 18 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at
0.0100, depicting that the probability for a Amber6 rating is greater for Amber=1 than 0.

Figure 9: Contingency Table Color Chart for Amber6 Given Amber
Table 18: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Amber6 Given Amber
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The contingency table in Table 19 shows the expected count of programs being
Amber from CDR-FF given the program is Amber at CA-CDR, is approximately 3.84.
The analysis results, however, were nearly double at 7 occurrences.
Table 19: Contingency Table for Amber6 Given Amber

Green6 given Green
The second significant finding relates to the dependency of Green6 (CDR-FF) to
Green (CA-CDR). This follows similar logic to Tier I results, in that early program cost
growth mitigation, can aid in future increments. Figure 10 shows the contingency table
results for this analysis. Table 20 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 0.0159
revealing that the probability of Green6=1 is higher for Green=1 than 0.

Figure 10: Contingency Table Color Chart for Green6 Given Green
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Table 20: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Green6 Given Green

The contingency table in Table 21 shows the expected count of programs being
Green during FF-DTE given the program is Green during CA-FF, is approximately 3.96,
whereas the analysis conducted returned a value of 7.
Table 21: Contingency Table for Green6 Given Green

Amber13 given Green6
Result 3 is perhaps one of the most unique seen thus far. The analysis now breaks
from traditional Green-Green relationships. This result highlights the dependency
between Amber at DTE-IOC and Green at CDR-FF. Figure 11 shows the contingency
table results for this analysis. Table 22 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at
0.0292, revealing that the probability of Amber13=1 is greater for Green=1 than 0.

50

Figure 11: Contingency Table Color Chart for Amber13 Given Green6

Table 22: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Amber13 Given Green6

This seems counter-intuitive to previous results in that it indicates programs is
more likely to experience cost growth rather than sustain lower levels previously
demonstrated early in the program. The contingency table (Table 23) shows the expected
count of a program being Amber during DTE-IOC given the program is Green during
CDR-FF, is approximately 2.6 whereas the analysis conducted returned a value of 5.
This appears to be an anomaly to previously discovered trends and is worth noting
for further research. Underlying program commonalities need to be investigated to
understand this relationship. However, it is a striking discovery, further validating the
need for longitudinal review of data. Patterns like this aren’t apparent when looking at
cost growth from a whole-program perspective.
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Table 23: Contingency Table for Amber13 Given Green6

Red6 given Red
The next significant relationship reverts back to traditional patterns revealing a
dependency between Red6 (CDR-FF) and Red (CA-CDR). Figure 12 shows the
contingency table results for this analysis. Table 24 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact
Test at 0.0312, revealing that the probability of Red6=1 is greater for Red=1 than 0.
The contingency table in Table 25 shows the expected count of a program being
Red during CDR-FF given the program is Red during CA-CDR is 0.96, or almost 1.
However, of the 4 programs that are rated Red at CA-CDR, 3 remain red at CDR-FF.

Figure 12: Contingency Table Color Chart for Red6 Given Red
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Table 24: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Red6 Given Red

Table 25: Contingency Table for Red6 Given Red

Amber10 given Small
To round out the strongest five relationships in Tier II, program size finally makes
an impact on color rating. This result shows the significant dependency between Amber
at FF-DTE and a program size of Small. Figure 13 shows the contingency table results
for this analysis. Table 26 shows the P-value for Fisher’s Exact Test at 0.0433, revealing
that the probability of Amber10=1 is greater for Small=1 than 0.

Figure 13: Contingency Table Color Chart for Amber10 Given Small
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Table 26: Fisher’s Exact Test Results for Amber10 Given Small

The contingency table in Table 27 shows the expected count of programs being
Amber during FF-DTE given the program is Small is 2.7, whereas this analysis observed
5 programs.
Table 27: Contingency Table for Red6 Given Red

Other Significant Findings
Of the Tier II relationships tested, 15 flagged as significant dependencies at the
confidence level α = 0.10; much less than Tier I. Table 28 shows the remaining 10
significant findings.
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Table 28: Other Significant Tier II Results
Response
Green10
Green10
Red10
Green15
Green13
Green6
Green13
Amber15
Amber15
Amber15

Predictor
AF
Navy
Green6
Modification
Green6
Amber
Red6
Red6
Green10
Amber10

Fishers Exact Test
0.0547
0.0547
0.0635
0.0642
0.0674
0.0749
0.0851
0.0851
0.0775
0.0775

Direction
Left
Right
Left
Right
Left
Left
Right
Right
Left
Right

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, the overall color rating trends of both Tiers I and Tier II are
explained to present the foundation of the research. The contingency table analysis of
significant variables is shown, and a separate in-depth analysis for each of the top five
predictor variables for both Tiers I and II is presented. Statistical testing and patterns
found within the data were discussed as they relate to recommended program
management response on future programs. Lastly, significant variables outside of the top
ten in-depth analyses are summarized. In the next chapter, the research is concluded and
broad discussions and meaning to the analysis is presented.
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V. Conclusions and Recommendations
Chapter Overview

The major finding in this research is the identification of statistically significant
predictor variables on cost growth risk ratings. This research also evaluates the traditional
approach to long-term cost growth review compared to a new longitudinal perspective of
sectional cost growth. This chapter reviews the initial research questions to validate that
the research accomplished the intended goal. Additionally, the limitations of findings are
reviewed, and areas for future research are identified.
Research Questions Answered
1 –How does cost growth behave differently between a segmented
longitudinal perspective and a traditional lifecycle perspective?
The answer to this question lies in two parts. First, when you map the color ratings
from Tier I (the traditional lifecycle perspective), with Tier II (the longitudinal
perspective), you can tell a distinct difference in how cost growth behaves at each review
measured. The color schemes are dramatically different, with Red dominating the
traditional approach and significantly more Green and Amber in the longitudinal
approach. There is no denying that having a more refined view of an issue can provide
insight that cannot be seen within the larger, lifecycle trends. It is in this fact that this
research provides a fresh perspective on cost growth trends. Though limited in scope,
this research paves the way for future research, in looking at cost growth as a near-term
trend than a long-term burden.
The second part to this question is a bit more blurry than the first. While there still
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remain distinctions between both perspectives, both hold a pretty common trend of
current performance dictating future performance. Very little significance was found
between characteristics of programs (i.e. size, length) for both tiers. This makes it harder
to distinguish the differences between the two. Overall, the predictor variables seem to
be consistent between both perspectives, although the significance varies among them.
2 – Are there differences in cost growth trends from a cross-sectional
perspective, than that of the overall program?
With respect to both Tier I and Tier II evaluations, the color ratings that were
defined, and the available data, the answer is yes. 47 total relationships were found to be
significant at α=0.10. 65% of the significant predictor variables were color ratings of
previous performance. This highlights the fact that, while there are some program traits
that lend to a given cost growth pattern, the overwhelming response of cost growth is
previous performance. This reiterates previous studies in that the importance lies with
making maximum effort to minimize cost growth early in a programs lifecycle, to ensure
minimal cost growth in the future.
Findings

The biggest finding was the undisputed influence DTE has on cost growth
relationships that are found to be significant. This is perhaps the big-picture take away
from this research, in that it is a key indicator for management as to where cost growth
performance has been, and where it will continue to go. DTE really appears as the crux
of the program, solidifying the cost growth fate, as you may have it. These findings echo
the previous work of Rosado (2011) which uses regression analysis to show DT&E as a
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level 3 WBS element is a significant driver for overall program EAC growth.
However, when you look at the overall results from a bigger picture perspective,
both the predictor and response variables are fairly evenly distributed over the phase of
the lifecycle impacted. This held true for both Tier I and Tier II findings. Figures 14
through 17 show the breakout of occurrences each program review appeared in either the
predictor or response variable respectively. Note that the “Other” category for predictor
responses accounts for any descriptive variable not defined as a program review point.
The ambiguity of predictor and response variables within significant findings,
make this research hard to project a summary result for management use. The interweb
of relationships makes for a very complex environment, making it unclear as to which
factors can really help management project their color rating risk.

Tier I Preditctor Variables
12%

CDR
FF

41%

DTE
29%

IOC
LRS
OTHER

0%

0%

18%

Figure 14: Tier I Predictor Variable Breakout
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Tier II Predictor Variables

27%

CDR

27%

FF
DTE

0%
0%

IOC
LRS

13%

OTHER

33%

Figure 15: Tier II Predictor Variable Breakout

Tier I Response Variables
18%

26%

CDR
FF
DTE
23%

15%

IOC
LRS

18%

Figure 16: Tier I Response Variable Breakout
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Tier II Response Variables
0%

27%

26%

CDR
FF
DTE
IOC

20%

27%

LRS

Figure 17: Tier II Response Variable Breakout
Limitations

We recognize several major limitations of this research, which may impact the
applicability to real-world scenarios. First and foremost, the results are a product of the
inputs. That being said, the limitations of our data collection filter through to weaker
results. As mentioned earlier, the inherent issues with the SAR pass through to create
issues within our database. Most notably, the magnitude of missing review dates really
impacted the ability to analyze cost growth performance from a longitudinal perspective.
Every missing date impacts at least two data points. With an already limited data set, this
further reduces the sample size available at each testing interval.
For further research on this database, or for a continuation of its progress, a dive
into additional sources to help complete and validate data would be essential in
improving the results. It is recommended to visit sources of hardcopy SAR data to help
with older program information. There were a variety of aircraft programs that were
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excluded due to the unavailability of data, which could be added in to the population
given it can be located.
Another limitation to the analysis is the subjectivity of how the color ratings are
applied. This research considers Green to represent cost growth of 1 or below. Many
would argue that programs are still satisfied with risk if their cost growth falls just
slightly above 1. The subjective nature can lead to varying results, potentially changing
the analysis all together. Understanding this limitation is necessary in evaluating
programs in question.
Recommendations for Future Research

Recommendations for future research encourage the exploration and use of the
original SAR database, as well as our modified research database. Whereas our research
is the first to explore predicting cost growth risk from a longitudinal perspective, it should
be acknowledged that follow-on research and other methodologies used to predict cost
growth should be encouraged. The cost estimating community can only estimate the
known, but as this research has shown, there are many ways cost growth can be analyzed
to help decision makers best prepare for known outcomes. Further exploration is highly
encouraged to help refine the concept of short-term cost growth analysis. Ways in which
this research can be carried forward include:
•

Collect more SAR data to further populate our research database with more
both more programs, and with population of missing data. This could help
confirm the significance of predictor variables, and perhaps identify new ones
as well.

•

Perform analysis with a different cost rating scale. Perhaps a survey of
program experts could help depict what real-world breakpoints would be
useful for Green, Amber and Red distinguishers.
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•

Apply this research method to programs outside of Aircraft. While new
program review markers would have to be identified (for instance, First
Flight), the application of the longitudinal perspective to other programs
would be interesting.

•

Develop a statistical model for this analysis. While this research only carries
as far as identifying the significant variables, it could be continued to develop
a model for real-world application.

Chapter Summary
This chapter discusses the relevant findings, limitations, and future research
opportunities available for continued analysis. This research serves as a stepping stone for
future efforts. The findings contained within this research bridge a gap between previous
longitudinal studies, particularly as it relates to a program. This research finds itself
sandwiched between high-level timeline studies, and detailed EVM studies on individual
contracts.
The application of color ratings to cost growth facilitates a new perspective and
perhaps a more hands-on approach for management involvement. This research should
serve as a tool to help bring cost growth analysis to the forefront of decision making, with
a simple and easily identifiable system. While exploratory in nature, the analysis of
variables against this color rating system has validated findings in previous cost growth
studies, as well as highlighted new areas for further investigation.
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Appendix A

Figure A1: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-CDR

Figure A2: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-FF

Figure A3: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-DT

63

Figure A4: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-IOC

Figure A5: CGF Distribution Summary for CA-LRS

Figure A6: CGF Distribution Summary for CDR-FF
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Figure A7: CGF Distribution Summary for CDR-DTE

Figure A8: CGF Distribution Summary for CDR-IOC

Figure A9: CGF Distribution Summary for CDR-LRS
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Figure A10: CGF Distribution Summary for FF-DTE

Figure A11: CGF Distribution Summary for FF-IOC

Figure A12: CGF Distribution Summary for FF-LRS
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Figure A13: CGF Distribution Summary for DTE-IOC

Figure A14: CGF Distribution Summary for DTE-LRS

Figure A15: CGF Distribution Summary for IOC-LRS
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Appendix B
Table B1: Contingency Table Results for Red2 given Red

Table B2: Contingency Table Results for Green2 given Green
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Table B3: Contingency Table Results for Green5 Given Red3

Table B4: Contingency Table Results for Red3 given Green2
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Table B5: Contingency Table Results for Red5 given Modification

Table B6: Contingency Table Results for Red4 given Red2
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Table B7: Contingency Table Results for Red given Large

Table B8: Contingency Table Results for Red2 given Prototype
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Table B9: Contingency Table Results for Green5 given Green2

Table B10: Contingency Table Results for Green5 given Green3
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Table B11: Contingency Table Results for Red5 given Green

Table B12: Contingency Table Results for Red2 given Medium
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Table B13: Contingency Table Results for Red5 given Red2

Table B14: Contingency Table Results for Amber2 given Amber
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Table B15: Contingency Table Results for Red3 given <180 Months

Table B16: Contingency Table Results for Green3 given Red2
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Table B17: Contingency Table Results for Green2 given Prototype

Table B18: Contingency Table Results for Green3 given Amber2
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Table B19: Contingency Table Results for Amber given Pre-1997

Table B20: Contingency Table Results for Amber2 given Medium
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Table B21: Contingency Table Results for Amber given Navy

Table B22: Contingency Table Results for Green4 given Red2
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Table B23: Contingency Table Results for Green4 given Red3

Table B24: Contingency Table Results for Red4 given Green2
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Table B25: Contingency Table Results for Red4 given Red3

Table B26: Contingency Table Results for Green given Pre-1997
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Table B27: Contingency Table Results for Red2 given Large
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Appendix C
Table C1: Contingency Table Results for Green10 given Air Force

Table C2: Contingency Table Results for Green10 given Navy
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Table C3: Contingency Table Results for Red10 given Green6

Table C4: Contingency Table Results for Green15 given Modification
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Table C5: Contingency Table Results for Green13 given Green6

Table C6: Contingency Table Results for Green6 given Amber
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Table C7: Contingency Table Results for Green13 given Red6

Table C8: Contingency Table Results for Amber15 given Red6
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Table C9: Contingency Table Results for Amber15 given Green10

Table C10: Contingency Table Results for Amber15 given Amber10
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